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on less conclusive evidence than it required at troughs, and that its
decision-making process in the vicinity of peaks proceeded by successive
approximations. Given that, on the average, decisions to ease are made
at lower certainty scores than decisions to tighten, this indicates that signs
of a probable peak signal the "need for action" while signs of recovery
do not. The Committee switched to tightness only after conclusive evi-
dence was available that cyclical recovery was underway and only after
being convinced that its action would not "nip the recovery in the bud."
But at peaks, the Committee attempted to stimulate economic activity
upon signals indicative of a probable recession, without waiting to be
sure that changing business conditions were cyclical in nature.
5
Conclusions
Utilizing the Federal Open Market Committee's discussions of business
conditions as given in its minutes, this study has assessed the ability of
the Committee to anticipate and recognize cyclical peaks and troughs
between 1947 and 1960. A scoring system developed by Rendigs Fels
for evaluating forecasts was used to quantify the Committee's views of
future economic conditions. Beginning three months before the NBER
dates of postwar business cycle peaks and troughs and ending six months
afterward, the FOMC's forecasts were scored. These scores represent an
estimate of the probability of a cyclical turn implicit in the Committee's
discussion of business conditions. The scores for this ten-month period
are called the recognition pattern and they indicate the Committee's
ability to recognize a cyclical turn as it is approached and then passed.
From this pattern of scores, two characteristics have been selected
as being particularly useful for evaluating the FOMC's forecasts. The
period between the date of a turn and the time when the Committee
first indicates that it believes a turn is more likely than not is defined
as the recognition lag. The period between the date of the turn and the122 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
time when the Committee first indicates that it is virtually certain that
a turn has occurred is defined as the confirmation lag.
Using these three concepts—the recognition pattern, the recognition
lag, and the confirmation lag, the FOMC's forecasts were compared with
those of the eight business analysts studied by Fels. Next, the Commit-
tee's policy decisions were related to its recognition pattern to determine
the relationship between the Committee's views of economic conditions
and its policy decisions.
This attempt to quantify the Committee's forecasts, to assess its ability
to recognize cyclical turns, to compare its performance with that of other
forecasters, and to relate its recognition pattern to its policy actions re-
vealed the following:
1. The beginning date of the Committee's recognition pattern varied
from one to nine months before the cyclical turn. The pattern at the
four peaks (1948, 1953, 1957, 1960) generally began before that at
the three troughs (1949, 1954, 1958). The two peaks (1953 and 1957)
for which the pattern began earliest are those which both the Com-
mittee and the business publications found easiest to recognize. On the
other hand, the ending of the recognition pattern varied from one to
seven months after the turn, and the pattern for troughs ended before
that of peaks. With the exception of the 1948 peak, the Committee was
certain of the occurrence of a turning point within six months after the
NBER date of the turn. At the date of the turn, the estimated probability
was generally below 50; it reached the vicinity of 50 about two months
after the turn.
2. The Committee's comments on the business outlook in the vicinity
of cyclical turns exhibit the same general pattern as that found by Fels
for the business publications: "As time goes by, analysts become in-
creasingly aware of first the possibility, then the probability, and finally
the certainty of a turning point." 117
Theover-all performance of the Committee in recognizing postwar
turns is not particularly impressive when compared with that of other
forecasters."8 Its performance was about the same as the average per-
formance of the eight business analysts. The Committee and the other
forecasters had mean certainty scores in the vicinity of peaks which
were strikingly similar. At troughs, however, the business analysts
117SeePart I, p.47.
118See,however, p.xviabove.Conclusions 123
"recognized" turning points earlier than the Committee but "confirmed"
their occurrence later.
3. The Committee has systematically been quicker to reverse the
direction of policy at peaks than at troughs, but it did so at sub-
stantially lower certainty scores. At peaks, action was taken soon after
the Committee became aware of the probability of a recession. At
troughs, changes in policy were made only after the FOMC was virtually
certain that cyclical recovery was underway.
4. The Committee's actions in the vicinity of peaks indicate the
difficulties involved in the concept of an inside lag or recognition lag
measured by a single number. The recognition of cyclical turns is a
gradual process and monetary policy, being a highly flexible tool, can
be slightly modified as the Committee's assessment of the outlook slowly
changes. For example, in 1957 the Committee made slight adjustments
in policy during both August and September (the peak occurred in
July). Neither change was made primarily because of concern about an
anticipated peak, yet the Committee was aware of changing business
conditions and this awareness was probably a factor contributing to its
decisions. A similar case occurred in 1953. In June, a month before
the peak, the FOMC injected reserves into the market primarily because
of an anticipated disorderly market in government securities. However,
concern about the future direction of economic activity may have in-
fluenced the Committee's decision. Again, in 1960 the Committee began
to change policy in the direction of ease three months before the NBER
date of the peak and continued easing almost continuously for the next
several months. What is more, the decision in February was made be-
cause the Committee recognized the deceleration in economic activity.
However, the minutes show that the members were not anticipating the
approaching downturn nor did they think a peak probable.
5. At both peaks and troughs, the more confident the Committee was
that changing business conditions were cyclical in nature, the more de-
cisive its action.